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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 1999–2023

I Do was China's wedding-ring champion — lab diamonds and fewer marriages broke it

The I Do brand behind China's wedding-diamond boom peaked at 715 stores; profit slid from ¥300M in 2017 to creditor-forced pre-restructuring in January 2023.

Hengxin Xili Industrial (恒信玺利) · I Do (brand) · 2023

What happened

In 1999 Li Houlin — the 'diamond tycoon' — founded Hengxin Diamond in Beijing. In 2006 he launched I Do, a brand built on one idea: the wedding ring. The marketing was relentless and effective: a couple endorsement from actors Jordan Chan and Cherie Ying, product placement in more than 70 films and TV dramas. At its peak the brand ran 715 stores across China and booked more than ¥2.2B in annual revenue — I Do had turned the diamond wedding ring into a Chinese luxury good.

The slide began in 2017. Net profit fell from ¥300M that year to ¥113M in 2021, while a decade of attempts to reach the public capital markets failed: two IPO applications from 2011, a 2015 backdoor listing that fell through, then the New Third Board, then more applications in 2017, 2018 and 2019 — all unsuccessful. When COVID lockdowns hit, the cost structure broke: in the first half of 2022 revenue fell 42% year on year to ¥628M, net profit dropped 89%, 85 stores closed, and headcount fell from 1,684 to 1,104.

The deeper problem was the product itself. I Do sold natural-diamond wedding rings into a market that was shrinking — China's marriage rate kept falling — while lab-grown diamonds crashed the price of the stone the whole business stood on. On 27 December 2022 a creditor applied for pre-restructuring; on 5 January 2023 the Qushui County court in Tibet issued the pre-restructuring order. By then the company's market value had fallen about 97% from its 2018 high.

Why it happened

  • I Do bet everything on the natural-diamond wedding ring — a product being commoditised by lab-grown stones, sold into a market shrinking with China's falling marriage rate.
  • A decade of failed IPO attempts (2011, a 2015 backdoor deal, 2017–2019) left the 715-store chain dependent on store cash flow, with no capital buffer when sales turned down.
  • Profit slid from ¥300M (2017) to ¥113M (2021); COVID lockdowns cut first-half 2022 revenue 42% and closed 85 stores — the chain could not shrink fast enough.
  • In January 2023 a creditor's pre-restructuring petition was accepted by a Tibet court — market value was down ~97% from 2018 and the wedding-ring champion was insolvent.
What it costMarket value −97%; 85 stores shut; staff 1,684→1,104costly

The lesson

A brand built on one shrinking ritual dies with it. I Do's moat was the natural-diamond ring; lab-grown stones and fewer marriages took price and customers, and no marketing could bring them back.

Aftermath

Hengxin Xili is in the reorganization execution period as of early 2026 — the plan covering Hengxin Xili and six subsidiaries went to a creditors' vote in 2025. The brand's network is gone: by February 2026 a flower supplier was still owed ¥20,000 from 2021, and a company executive nine months of salary. The market I Do bet on changed beneath it: De Beers was holding more than $2B in rough inventory and cut prices 10–15% in early 2026, because lab-grown diamonds had turned the natural stone into a commodity.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →