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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2021–2026

One ring per lifetime: DR Ring lost ¥52B of market cap in nine months

Di'ai IPO'd in December 2021 on one rule: a man may buy one DR engagement ring in his life. Three years on, revenue had fallen by two-thirds.

Di'ai Co (迪阿股份, 301177.SZ / DR钻戒) · 2026-04-28

What happened

Di'ai listed on ChiNext on December 15, 2021 selling a single promise: a man may commission only one DR engagement ring in his lifetime, bound to his ID. The first-day close was ¥165.01, up 41.18%, market capitalisation over ¥66 billion; at the intraday high the company was worth more than ¥70 billion. Engagement rings were 77% of revenue and the gross margin ran near 70%. The founder-couple's bet was that China's marriage market would keep paying a premium for the proof of one true love.

The brand broke in public. In September 2022 a trending post claimed a bestselling DR ring cost ¥1,000–1,100 to make; alongside it ran a rumour that purchase records could be erased for a fee — later ruled false — but the public verification system was shut down, and 'IQ tax' stuck to the name. The market cap fell to ¥18.7 billion in nine months. Revenue fell three years running — −20.4% in 2022, −40.8% in 2023, −32.0% in 2024 to ¥1.48 billion — orders down 20%, average spend down 13.7%, a deducted loss of ¥126 million in 2024, and 172 store closures: a net loss of 155 doors.

The industry moved against diamonds: the market fell 26.8% in 2023, Shanghai Diamond Exchange turnover dropped 35% to $2.02 billion in 2024, and gold's 70%-plus surge took the wedding budgets. Di'ai's answer was shrinkage: 28 more net closures in 2025 to 345 stores; revenue steadied at ¥1.52 billion (+2.5%), net profit rose 162% to ¥139 million — mostly from cuts, with rent, renovation and labour down ¥103.8 million — while overseas sales almost doubled to ¥94 million. In Q1 2026 part of the profit growth came from wealth-management returns.

Why it happened

  • The IPO priced a permanent premium: listed in December 2021 at the top of the market, just before marriage registrations, diamond prices and consumer confidence all fell at once.
  • The promise was the product: when a viral cost exposé and a record-deletion rumour hit the 'one ring per lifetime' claim, the brand had no second leg — 77% of sales was the engagement ring.
  • Diamonds lost the wedding budget: market −26.8% in 2023, exchange turnover −35% in 2024, gold up over 70% — there was nowhere for DR's premium to hide.
What it costMarket cap ¥70B→¥18.7B; revenue down two-thirdscatastrophic

The lesson

DR sold a 70% margin on a promise bound to an ID card, and IPO'd at the top of the wedding market. When marriages and diamond prices fell, the promise alone could not hold the price.

Aftermath

What remains is 345 stores with revenue per door up 26% at ¥3.5 million, overseas at 6.2% of sales and doubling, and a company profitable again — but on a third of the IPO-year revenue, with FY2025 deducted profit of just ¥4.2 million: the business barely breaks even without the cost discipline. Management calls 2025 the end of channel optimisation and pushes overseas and the 'true-love scene' upgrade. Whether 'one love per lifetime' still commands a price premium in a market that moved its wedding budget from diamonds to gold is the open question.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →