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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Strategic decision · 2010–2026

China's largest car dealer booked its first loss since listing

Zhongsheng, No.1 dealer by revenue, was profitable every listed year until FY2025: ¥164.4B of sales, a ¥1.673B loss, and ¥3.174B of gross loss on cars.

Zhongsheng Group Holdings (中升控股, 881.HK) · 2026-03-26

What happened

Zhongsheng Group is China's largest car dealer by revenue and had been profitable in every year since its Hong Kong listing — until FY2025. The model was the classic one, run better than anyone's: luxury and traditional brands up front, after-sales service carrying the margin behind it. FY2024 still made ¥3.212 billion of attributable profit. Then the price war stopped being a phase and became the structure of the market.

FY2025 (published March 26, 2026): revenue ¥164.403 billion, down 2.2% — and a first-ever attributable loss of ¥1.673 billion. Total gross profit ¥8.838 billion, down 17.2%, with car sales running a gross loss of ¥3.174 billion. New cars sold below purchase price across traditional brands, manufacturer subsidies unable to cover the spread; auto-finance commission income slid at the same time; and ¥2.291 billion of goodwill and intangibles were written off. Volume still grew: 497,300 new cars sold, up 2.5%, luxury sales up 6.2% — AITO/Wenjie at 8.2% of sales.

The response is a managed conversion. After-sales held the line: revenue ¥22.911 billion, up 4.1%, gross profit ¥11.05 billion, up 8.2%. Operating cash flow rose ¥5.966 billion to ¥9.405 billion. From H2 2024 to end-2025 the group closed about 50 inefficient or redundant brand stores while adding 104 — a net gain of 54, of which 30 came in FY2025. For 2026 the stated target is to double the number of NEV stores, expanding Huawei-ecosystem brands and a strategic cooperation with Geely. On April 23, 2026 the share price hit a record low anyway.

Why it happened

  • New cars became structurally loss-making: purchase prices inverted against selling prices across traditional brands, subsidies unable to cover the spread — a ¥3.174 billion gross loss on 497,300 cars.
  • The second profit pillar cracked: auto-finance commission income declined, removing the offset that used to absorb new-car losses.
  • The past had to be written down: ¥2.291 billion of goodwill and intangibles impaired — premiums paid for a network built for a combustion era that no longer exists.
What it costFirst loss since listing; cars grossed -¥3.174Bcostly

The lesson

Zhongsheng was the dealer everyone studied: No.1 by revenue, profitable every listed year. In 2025 it booked its first loss — no operational excellence outruns an industry-wide price inversion.

Aftermath

The balance sheet says the patient is stable: ¥9.405 billion of operating cash flow, after-sales gross profit up 8.2%, a net gain of 30 stores in the loss year itself. The conversion plan says where management thinks the margin went: double the NEV store count in 2026, lean into Huawei-ecosystem brands and Geely, keep harvesting after-sales while the ICE fleet ages. But the market priced the risk on April 23, 2026, when the share hit a record low: whether ¥164 billion of scale can be steered from combustion to electric before the after-sales tail shrinks too is the open question.

Sources

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