What happened
铂爵旅拍 (Bojue Wedding Photography) helped create China's destination-wedding-photography category in 2014 and grew into the country's most visible wedding photography chain through relentless marketing — elevator ads, TV show sponsorships, and A-list celebrity endorsements. At its peak it operated stores across China's major wedding destinations including Sanya, Lijiang and Xiamen, and was a regular vendor on Li Jiaqi's livestream.
The business model was heavy on fixed costs: large stores in prime tourist locations, a huge marketing budget, and a franchise-light expansion that added scale without adding profitability. China's falling marriage rate (2024 registrations hit their lowest since 1980) cut the addressable market, while the rise of smaller photography studios on Douyin and Xiaohongshu eroded prices. The company sought a Series B round but was turned down — investors saw a high-asset, low-margin model with no defensible moat.
In July 2025 the company announced 'off-season leave' for its wedding photography division, effective through October. Stores closed. Employees revealed ¥15 million in unpaid wages. Customers who had booked packages — many through Li Jiaqi's livestream — could not reach customer service. The founder, Xu Chunsheng, had ¥16 million of his equity frozen by the Xiamen court in March 2025. Of the 40 companies under the 铂爵 umbrella, 16 had already been deregistered. A brand built on celebrity endorsement and elevator ads had no operating business underneath.
What it cost
Elevator ads and celebrity endorsements built awareness but not repeat business; when Series B investors refused, ¥15M in wages went unpaid and all stores closed.
Why it happened
Elevator ads and celebrity endorsements built brand awareness but not repeat business — wedding photography is a one-time purchase, so every customer must be acquired at full cost again.
Large flagship stores in tourist destinations created a fixed-cost base that could not flex when marriage rates fell and bookings dropped.
The business depended on continuous expansion funding — when Series B investors said no, there was no margin or cash reserve to fall back on.
Smaller studios on Douyin and Xiaohongshu offered comparable quality at lower prices without the overhead of a national chain, squeezing 铂爵 from below.
The lesson
A brand that spends millions to acquire a customer who never returns must make every transaction profitable. When marketing stops, revenue stops — no second visit to subsidise the first.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- 36氪 — 一个铂爵倒了,无数个旅拍工作室还在苦熬 (2025-07-31) 36kr.com
- 界面新闻 — 铂爵旅拍否认跑路,承认缩减业务 (2025-07-19) m.jiemian.com
- 搜狐 — 铂爵旅拍欠薪关店 (2025-07) sohu.com