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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2013–2023

Yanjiyou built a ¥100M flagship bookstore in Xi'an — 2 years later it had 5 stores left

Yanjiyou expanded on flagship stores built to be destinations. COVID crushed traffic, and the flagships that built the brand became the debt that sank it.

言几又 (Yanjiyou) · 2020-02

What happened

Yanjiyou, founded by Dan Jie and branded from 2013, opened its first Beijing store in Zhongguancun in 2014, growing on the back of four funding rounds through 2018 — including two rounds each exceeding ¥100 million — to roughly 50-60 stores nationwide by 2019, with a public plan to reach 100 stores by year-end. Its signature format was the large-format flagship built to function as a destination in itself: the Xi'an Maike Center store, opened October 2018 at over 4,500 square meters and designed by a former Tsutaya Books designer, cost more than ¥100 million in design and fit-out alone.

COVID-19 hit in February 2020, and sales fell more than 90%; Dan Jie told media the company faced a funding gap of ¥20-30 million. No new funding arrived after the 2018 round, and negotiations with mall landlords for rent relief largely failed — one mall reportedly cut power over an unpaid deposit dispute. Wage arrears for staff began as early as April 2020. The flagship format that had built Yanjiyou's reputation now meant every closure was expensive: the Xi'an flagship closed in June 2020 and was replaced by Tsutaya Books itself two months later.

Closures continued through 2021 and 2022 — Guangzhou's K11 flagship, Beijing's Wangfujing Central store, then entire cities' worth of stores through the year. By August 2022, only five stores remained nationwide; by February 2023, even Shanghai's last store had closed. Court records from April 2023 showed Yanjiyou's Shanghai entity carrying over ¥64 million in enforcement judgments, listed as a blacklisted debtor for refusing to pay despite having the means; Dan Jie was placed under a consumption restriction order.

Why it happened

  • Building destination-scale flagship stores made each location expensive to open, expensive to staff, and expensive to close, removing the flexibility a smaller-format retailer would have had.
  • Expansion relied on continuous new funding rounds rather than store-level profitability, so the funding freeze after 2018 left no path to cover an external shock.
  • COVID's 90% sales drop hit hardest exactly where Yanjiyou had concentrated its bet — large, foot-traffic-dependent flagship spaces in malls and city centers.
  • Failed rent-relief negotiations with landlords show the company had no reserve or leverage to renegotiate its largest fixed costs once revenue collapsed.
What it cost50-60 stores at peak; 5 remained by mid-2022costly

The lesson

A store built to be a destination is the most expensive one to keep and to lose. Yanjiyou's ¥100M flagship built its reputation, then became a cost it couldn't carry two empty months.

Aftermath

By early 2023 Yanjiyou had closed every remaining store, including its last in Shanghai. Its founder was placed under a consumption restriction order after the company was listed as a blacklisted debtor over more than ¥64 million in unpaid court judgments. The Xi'an flagship space was taken over by Tsutaya Books, the same design lineage Yanjiyou had drawn on to build it.

Sources

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