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The encyclopedia · Sales & Retail · Strategic decision · 2018–2025

T11 raised $100M+ for its premium supermarket — then all 8 stores closed

Backed by IDG and Alibaba, T11 opened flagship fresh-food stores in Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan. By May 2025 every single one was shut.

T11

What happened

T11 (Together & Top) was founded in 2018 by Du Yong, a former JD 7FRESH executive, as a premium fresh-food supermarket chain for China's wealthiest neighbourhoods. Investors included IDG Capital, Heyu Capital and, in a $100 million B round, Alibaba. Its first store, in Beijing's Chaoyang Park, covered 4,000 square metres with nearly 7,000 SKUs and an average ticket above ¥180.

The model was built for scale that never came. T11 required large, expensive flagship spaces in high-end locations, imported-intensive inventory and a high-touch service team. Each store needed dense local demand from a narrow demographic — the kind of site that took months to find and approve. By late 2024 T11 had opened only eight stores across Beijing (5), Shanghai (2) and Wuhan (1), far too few to absorb the overhead of a central supply chain and management layer.

The end came quickly. Beijing's Guoaocheng store, the 1733 store and the Guanghua Xincheng discount store closed in late 2024 and early 2025. Shanghai and Wuhan stores followed. On 12 May 2025 the original Chaoyang Park flagship — the brand's proof of concept — posted its closure notice. T11's mini-program could no longer find a single store. The premium supermarket format that had convinced Alibaba to write a $100 million cheque died with eight stores and no path to viability.

Why it happened

  • A premium supermarket that requires a 4,000-square-metre flagship and ¥180 average ticket cannot scale — the site-finding bar is too high and the demographic too thin, so costs never amortise.
  • Imported-heavy inventory lost its pricing edge as cross-border e-commerce matured — T11's imported goods were 10-20% more expensive than online, destroying the value proposition.
  • The operating model required a central supply chain and management layer that eight stores could not support — each new store added more overhead than gross margin.
  • VC money funded an expensive retail format with no intrinsic profitability; when capital tightened after 2021, retail fundamentals would not be closed with another round.
What it cost$100M+ raised; 8 stores all closed; valuation zerocostly

The lesson

A premium retail format needs more than investment dollars — it needs a unit model that works at one store before the hundredth. If a single flagship cannot break even, ten will lose ten times more.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →