The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 1997–2026
Cuiwei paid ¥1.945B for a payments arm that now loses money on every transaction
Beijing's Cuiwei paid ¥1.945B for Haike Rongtong in 2020. It is now 67% of revenue at a negative gross margin; the group lost ¥1.75B in three years.
Cuiwei Co (翠微股份, 603123) · Haike Rongtong (海科融通) · 2026-03-27
What happened
Cuiwei Building opened in Beijing's Haidian district on November 18, 1997 and grew into the district's department-store chain, listed on the Shanghai exchange as Cuiwei Co. By 2019 the format was shrinking, so the company reached for a second business: in December 2020 it completed a ¥1.945 billion acquisition of 98.3% of Haike Rongtong, a nationwide bank-card acquiring company, paid 70% in shares and 30% in cash — a department store buying a payments firm as its growth engine.
The thesis was the license: with regulation squeezing out smaller acquirers, one of only a few dozen nationwide acquiring licenses left would only gain value. What arrived instead was a business that got worse every year. Haike Rongtong lost ¥275 million in 2022, ¥310 million in 2023 and ¥378 million in 2024; by 2025 its gross margin had turned negative — minus 0.73% — losing money on every transaction even as volume grew 23% to ¥1.16 trillion. It cycled through four general managers in four years and was fined more than ¥15 million in under two years.
The bill: three straight loss years — ¥584 million in 2023, ¥687 million in 2024, ¥481 million in 2025, over ¥1.75 billion combined, with Haike Rongtong contributing over half. Payments are now 67% of group revenue and the retail side — merchandise sales down 10.31% in 2025 — can no longer carry anything. Net assets fell 22.4% to ¥1.659 billion, unrecovered losses past a third of paid-in capital, no dividend. With the payment license expiring December 21, 2026, Cuiwei injected ¥100 million into the subsidiary to qualify for renewal — paying again to keep the business that broke it.
Why it happened
- The acquisition thesis was scarcity — a nationwide acquiring license amid regulatory consolidation — but scarcity of a license says nothing about the margins of the business underneath it.
- Payments became the core of the group — 67% of revenue — at a negative gross margin: growth in volume to ¥1.16 trillion meant more transactions losing more money.
- No rescuer had scale: the retail side that bought the payments firm was itself shrinking 10% a year, so three years of compounding losses had nothing to absorb them.
The lesson
A scarce license is not a profitable business. Cuiwei paid ¥1.945B for payments and got a commodity with negative margins, churn and fines — while the store it was meant to rescue kept shrinking.
Aftermath
The renewal is the next bill: ¥100 million injected into Haike Rongtong to qualify for the license renewal due December 21, 2026, with the general-manager seat vacant since May 2026 and the subsidiary's own debt ratio above 93%. On the retail side the plan is renovation — Cuiwei and Mudanyuan store upgrades, a ¥200 million urban-renewal rebuild of the Contemporary Mall Zhongguancun store, and ¥111 million of rent relief easing the transition. The losses narrowed in 2025; they did not stop.
Sources
- Eastmoney — Cuiwei Co 2025 results: revenue ¥2.32B, net loss ¥481M narrows from ¥687M, 2026-03-27
- Sina Finance — Cuiwei Co 2025 annual report analysis: third straight loss year, all four expense lines cut, 2026-03-27
- Eastmoney Caifuhao — Haike Rongtong's fourth GM change: ¥1.166B lost in four years, negative gross margin, license renewal, 2026-05-14
- 10jqka — Cuiwei Co 2025 net loss ¥481M, 2026-03-28
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