Back to the archive

The encyclopedia · Trading & Investing · Financial decision · 2000–2007

Amaranth lost $6B in a week — one trader's gas bets destroyed a $9B hedge fund

Amaranth Advisors was a $9B multistrategy hedge fund. In 2006, one natural gas trader lost $6.6B in a week — the largest hedge fund collapse ever.

Amaranth Advisors · 2006-09-18

What happened

Amaranth Advisors was founded in 2000 by Nicholas Maounis in Greenwich, Connecticut as a multistrategy hedge fund. By August 2006 it had grown to $9.2 billion in assets under management, investing across convertible arbitrage, mergers, and energy trading. The energy desk was run by Brian Hunter, a 32-year-old Canadian trader who had made an estimated $1 billion for the firm in 2005 by betting on natural gas prices after Hurricane Katrina. Hunter was paid roughly $100 million that year under a 15% profit arrangement and was given increasing control over the fund's natural gas positions.

In 2006, Hunter went long on winter natural gas futures and short on summer contracts — a bet that the winter-summer price gap would widen. When prices did not move as expected, losses accelerated. Margin requirements exceeded $3 billion. The fund was still marketing itself as up 25% for the year during the week of September 11. On September 18, Amaranth disclosed roughly $3 billion in losses — then the losses continued. By the time the position was unwound, the fund had lost over $6.6 billion, more than 65% of its value. It was the largest hedge fund collapse in history at the time.

Amaranth sold the natural gas position to JPMorgan and Citadel for $2.5 billion and suspended redemptions for two months. The fund was defunct by September 2007. The CFTC charged Hunter with attempted manipulation; he settled in 2014, paying a $750,000 fine and accepting a trading ban. A FERC judge ruled Hunter manipulated settlement prices, though a court later overturned FERC's $30 million fine. The fund sued JPMorgan for $1 billion, dismissed. Taleb noted the firm's twelve risk managers were meaningless — the models never questioned the position size.

Why it happened

  • Amaranth called itself a multistrategy fund but was effectively a single-direction bet on natural gas — one trader held all the risk and the diversification was a mirage.
  • Brian Hunter's 2005 hurricane Katrina success earned him the trust to take positions that were far too large for the fund's overall portfolio — the tail wagged the dog.
  • The risk management system failed completely: twelve risk managers did not flag a position that could lose $6B in a week, because the models assumed the spread would behave as it had historically.
  • The fund continued marketing itself as up 25% for the year while the position was already imploding — management was unaware of the true risk in real time.
What it cost$6.6B lost, fund collapsed, 65% of AUM wiped outcatastrophic

The lesson

A 'multistrategy' label is meaningless when one trader holds all the risk. A single concentrated bet in natural gas destroyed a $9B fund, and twelve risk managers never stopped it.

Aftermath

The Amaranth collapse was the largest hedge fund failure at the time, surpassing LTCM's 1998 meltdown, and became a textbook case of concentrated positions in a supposedly diversified fund. Ten years later, about 90% of assets had been returned; 10% remained frozen. The CFTC and FERC actions against Hunter signaled aggressive pursuit of gas manipulation, though the overturned FERC fine highlighted regulatory ambiguity. Hunter's trading ban ended his Wall Street career. Maounis later founded Verition Fund Management, but Amaranth stuck as shorthand for letting one trader's bets define a firm.

Sources

spotted an error? The club wants to know.

Comments · 0

    Sign in to join the comments.

    More like this

    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →