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Sunac China bought Wanda's theme parks with borrowed money — then had to restructure twice

Sunac funded takeovers like its 43.8B-yuan Wanda deal with offshore bonds — when credit tightened, it needed two separate restructurings to survive.

Sunac China Holdings · Dalian Wanda Group · 2023-11-20

What happened

Sunac grew through the 2010s by buying what other developers were selling, on borrowed money. The largest single deal came in 2017, when Dalian Wanda Group needed to cut its own debt: Sunac paid 43.8 billion yuan for a 91% stake in 13 of Wanda's cultural-tourism and theme-park projects, and took on 45.4 billion yuan of debt tied to those assets in the process. It was one of many leveraged acquisitions Sunac funded with offshore US-dollar bonds, layering foreign debt onto a business whose revenue came in yuan.

When Beijing's 2020–2021 credit tightening on developers cut off the refinancing that roll-up strategy depended on, Sunac defaulted on its debt in May 2022. It spent the next eighteen months negotiating with creditors before completing, in November 2023, a restructuring of roughly 90 billion yuan (about $12.65 billion) of combined onshore and offshore debt — swapping bonds for new dollar notes, mandatory convertible bonds, ordinary convertible bonds and shares in Sunac Services, cutting total debt by about $4.5 billion and diluting existing shareholders as creditors converted into equity.

The November 2023 deal did not end it. By late 2024 Sunac was back at the table with mainland creditors over a separate 15.4 billion yuan slice of onshore debt, offering cash repurchase, equity payment, asset-based settlement or long-term extensions — a plan aimed at halving that remaining onshore liability. A further offshore restructuring, covering about $9.6 billion, followed in 2025.

Why it happened

  • Sunac funded acquisitions like the Wanda deal with offshore dollar bonds against yuan revenue, so a shift in mainland credit conditions raised the cost of debt it had already spent.
  • Buying assets and their attached liabilities — Sunac took on 45.4 billion yuan of debt tied to the Wanda tourism projects alone — compounded leverage rather than just paying a purchase price.
  • Growth-by-acquisition assumed refinancing would stay available; when Beijing tightened developer credit in 2020–2021, that failed and left no way to service the debt already taken on.
  • One restructuring did not close the gap: the 2023 deal covered ~90B yuan, but a separate 15.4B yuan onshore slice needed its own restructuring a year later.
What it cost~90B yuan restructured 2023; second onshore round 2024costly

The lesson

Debt taken on to fund growth still has to be serviced once growth stops. Financing acquisitions in foreign currency against local-currency revenue works only as long as refinancing stays open.

Aftermath

Sunac's restructuring was cited as the first completed by a major defaulted Chinese developer, but the company kept needing new rounds: a second onshore restructuring in 2024–2025 and a further offshore restructuring covering about $9.6 billion completed in late 2025, well after the original 2023 deal that was billed as a resolution.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →