Nayuki lost 95% of its market cap — HK$34B to HK$1.4B in 5 years

Nayuki (奈雪的茶) was founded in Shenzhen in 2015 and rode the 'new tea' wave to become China's most famous premium tea chain alongside Heytea. In June 2021 it listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as the 'new tea first stock' at HK$17.12 per share, giving it a market capitalization of over HK$34 billion.

The IPO story was a D2C growth narrative, but the economics never worked. Nayuki's premium-priced fruit tea and bakery model was asset-heavy — large stores with seating, fresh ingredients, and expensive locations. From 2021 to 2025, the company accumulated over RMB 2 billion in net losses. Revenue peaked at RMB 4.92 billion in 2024, then fell 12% to RMB 4.33 billion in 2025 as the company closed underperforming stores.

By March 2026, Nayuki's stock had fallen to HK$0.83 — a 95% decline from its IPO price. The company had closed 152 stores in 2025 alone, reducing its direct-store network from 1,574 to 1,288. Its average ticket price had nearly halved from RMB 43 to RMB 24.4, as price competition from cheaper tea chains forced it to discount. Franchise expansion, which was supposed to fuel the next growth phase, added only 13 net new stores in all of 2025.

Nayuki's failure is the purest example of the Chinese D2C bubble: a brand that went public on hype, burned through billions in investor capital, and never built a business that could stand on its own. The 'premium new tea' category turned out to be a low-margin commodity business, and Nayuki's IPO price was the industry's peak — not its beginning.

IPO'd at HK$34B on hype, but the model never worked: ticket prices fell from RMB 43 to RMB 24.4, 152 stores closed in 2025, and cumulative losses exceeded RMB 2B.

Nayuki's premium-priced, large-store model required high unit economics that the market would not support — average ticket dropped from RMB 43 to RMB 24.4 as competition drove prices down.

The company relied on continuous store openings for revenue growth, but same-store sales declined; closing 152 stores in 2025 was an admission that the model had not worked.

IPO proceeds and investor capital funded losses for five years without ever achieving sustained profitability — a classic D2C burn story with no path to margin.

Franchise expansion failed to compensate: only 13 net new franchise stores in 2025, compared to thousands of new stores opened by competitors like Mixue (60,000 stores) and Guming.

A D2C brand that cannot make money as a private company will not magically find profitability by going public. An IPO is not a business model — it is a deadline.

Nayuki continued to operate 1,646 stores in total as of late 2025. The company reduced losses significantly in 2025 (RMB 241M vs RMB 919M in 2024) through store closures, but the trajectory of store contraction and declining revenue suggests the business is shrinking to a sustainable size rather than recovering. Competitors Mixue, Guming, and ChaPanda all expanded aggressively while Nayuki contracted.