Meitehao had ¥8.6B revenue and 200 stores — then a prepaid card run killed it

Meitehao was founded in 1993 in Taiyuan, Shanxi, and grew into the province's largest retailer. At its peak it operated nearly 200 stores across Shanxi with annual revenue of ¥8.6 billion in 2023. It was ranked No.1 among Shanxi retailers by sales.

Like most Chinese supermarket chains, Meitehao was undermined by the decline of the hypermarket format. E-commerce, instant delivery and discount grocery chains eroded foot traffic and revenue. But Meitehao compounded the problem by using prepaid card deposits — customer money loaded onto stored-value cards — to fund long-term investments in logistics parks and central kitchens. This created a classic 'short borrowing, long investment' mismatch: the cash was needed on demand, but it was tied up in illiquid assets.

The crisis broke in October 2025. Meitehao closed more than a dozen stores without the 30-day notice required by law. Customers rushed to spend their stored-value cards, triggering a run. In three months, consumers cashed out ¥1.1–1.2 billion — draining the company's working capital. By December 2025, the cash flow was exhausted and Meitehao filed for pre-reorganization with the Taiyuan Intermediate Court.

The debt exceeded ¥5 billion, spread across 3,000 creditors. In January 2026, the court formally accepted the restructuring and 54 affiliated entities were consolidated into a single reorganization. State-owned Shanxi Shennong Investment Group was brought in to operate the stores, but did not assume the debt. Meitehao became another casualty of the Chinese supermarket industry's structural decline — a regional champion undone by format disruption, poor capital management, and a self-inflicted liquidity crisis.

Meitehao's ¥8.6B revenue and 200 stores collapsed into ¥5B+ debt and a prepaid card run that drained ¥1.1–1.2B in three months.

Meitehao used prepaid card deposits to fund long-term assets — a short-borrowing, long-investment mismatch that collapsed when customers rushed to cash out.

Closing stores without the legally required 30-day notice triggered a prepaid card run that drained ¥1.1–1.2 billion in three months — the cash the company needed to operate.

The hypermarket format was in structural decline from e-commerce, instant delivery and discount stores, and Meitehao had no effective digital or competitive response.

Meitehao attempted to copy Sam's Club with a membership store format ('Happy Grand Marketplace'), but lacked the supply chain and private-label strength to compete.

Prepaid card deposits are demand liabilities, not capital. Funding long-term investments creates a maturity mismatch any disruption can trigger. Meitehao was destroyed by its liability structure.

Meitehao was placed under the operational management of Shanxi Shennong Investment Group, a state-owned enterprise, which reopened some stores under the brand 'Shennong Meitehao'. The 54-company consolidated reorganization continued through 2026, with the first creditor meeting in May 2026. The court-appointed administrator continued to collect claims and asset recovery. Most stores remained closed. The case became a textbook example in China of how regional retail chains fail when they confuse customer deposits with free capital.