In January 2008 Dubai developer Limitless, the property arm of state-owned Dubai World, began preliminary work on the Arabian Canal: a 150-metre-wide, six-metre-deep, $11bn waterway it called 'the largest and most complex civil engineering project ever undertaken in the Middle East', to be finished in three years. Around it the company planned a $50bn city of marinas and homes on 20,000 hectares inland of the new Al Maktoum airport, built out over 15 years for about a million people. Land sales were meant to start that June.

By November 2008 Limitless postponed the sales launch — 'everything is ready to sell, we're just judging the best time to start', project director Ian Raine said — while insisting it 'will not let this short-term crisis affect the long term vision of Dubai'. In April 2009 MEED reported the 2012 completion date was gone: the Roads and Transport Authority had terminated the Parsons-Halcrow design contract for the sea link and its 13 highway crossings, the second excavation package award was on hold, and the contractor on the first had been told to slow down.

The first package alone meant moving 200 million cubic metres of earth. The rescheduling came with no new end date, only a promise to proceed 'when the time is right'. In November 2009 parent Dubai World asked creditors for a standstill, and by May 2010 it had agreed in principle to restructure $23.5bn of debts, converting $8.9bn of government loans into equity — with its property developments at the centre of the crisis. The canal's earthworks never restarted at pace, and the city around it never sold its first plot.

The $11bn canal lost its 2012 deadline in 2009; its $50bn, 1.5-million-resident city never sold a plot; Dubai World restructured $23.5bn of debts.

Sales, funding and the detailed sea-link design were never locked before launch: the land sale due in June 2008 was the project's only revenue engine, and it was shelved within months.

The 75km route needed 13 major highway crossings designed by the RTA; when that design contract was terminated the inland works had nowhere to discharge, yet the project had no fallback sequence.

Scale promises ('largest and most complex civil engineering project ever') set a cost base no private demand could carry once the 2008 crash hit leveraged Dubai land sales.

Management treated the downturn as 'short-term' and kept the vision narrative, rescheduling without a new date instead of re-scoping a buildable core.

Launching a megaproject before sales, funding and the anchor design are locked turns a downturn into indefinite shelving. Phase the works and tie spending to pre-sold demand.

MEED recorded the 2012 completion as abandoned in April 2009, with only the first of roughly ten planned excavation contracts moving, at a reduced rate. Land sales stayed frozen. Dubai World's November 2009 standstill was followed in May 2010 by an agreement in principle to restructure $23.5bn, converting $8.9bn of government debt into equity, with its property operations identified as the source of the trouble. Limitless' other projects were wound into the restructuring, and the 75km canal was left as part-dug desert earthworks outside the 2012 story Dubai had sold.

FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE

The sources

  1. Limitless begins work on $11b Arabian Canal project gulfnews.com
  2. Limitless reviews Arabian Canal project and staff gulfnews.com
  3. Arabian Canal construction hits delays meed.com
  4. Limitless to delay selling Arabian Canal plots thenationalnews.com
  5. Dubai World says debt deal agreed in principle bbc.co.uk