Iraq announced the Baghdad Metro in late 2023 as the answer for a capital of more than eight million people with no urban rail: roughly 150km of lines, 60-plus stations, priced above $17bn. In July 2024 the job went to a European-Turkish consortium — France's Systra, SNCF and Alstom with Spain's Talgo and SENER and Turkish contractors, backed by Deutsche Bank — while Malaysia's HSS Engineers and its UAE affiliate took the oversight role, a contract Malaysian media valued at RM1.5bn. Critics attacked the process within days, and the prime minister's office had to clarify how the award was made.

It came apart from the client side. In July 2025, barely a year after the award, the prime minister's adviser said the project would be retendered under a new technical and financial framework. In June 2026 Mohammed Al-Najjar, executive director of the Iraq Development Fund, a principal financier, went further: the metro 'was launched prematurely before the necessary studies were completed', his fund had identified 34 areas needing review, and even a relaunched project could not start for a year to 18 months.

For the private winners the prize became paperwork. HSS's cash flow turned negative in the quarter ended March 2026; the first milestone payment of $750,000 — part of a $5.2m share as project management consultant — was secured only by a Trade Bank of Iraq letter of credit in July 2026, and brokerage CGSI tied any work resumption to the completion of Iraqi elections. The consultancy spent 2026 chasing RM300m of replenishment orders to refill an order book that Baghdad's rewind had emptied.

HSS's RM1.5bn consultancy award stalled: cash flow went negative in 1Q26 and only a $750k first payment landed in July 2026, two years after the win.

The tender ran ahead of its own engineering: population and routing studies were unfinished when the $17bn award was made, so the financier could credibly call it premature.

Procurement legitimacy was contested from day one — favouritism allegations forced a prime-ministerial clarification within days, leaving the award politically undefended.

Iraq's fiscal machinery, from cabinet changes to a fund reviewing 34 areas, can pause any megaproject; for contractors a government signature is a revocable option, not a contract.

HSS booked the win, not the cash: two years on, collections stood at one $750k milestone against an order book that needed rebuilding.

Winning the contract is not winning the project. On fragile public procurement an award can evaporate before kickoff — engineers must price retender risk and pre-payment risk into the deal.

The project remains officially alive: officials say the metro will be built in stages, and the Iraq Development Fund frames its review as preparation for a relaunch under a new technical and financial framework. The original consortium's award has not been reinstated. For HSS, CGSI still models a cashflow recovery as the $5.2m consultant share lands by late 2026. Two years after the fanfare, Baghdad's eight million residents have no metro and no construction start — and the scheme's own financing gatekeeper rates the starting line as a year to 18 months away.

FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE

The sources

  1. Iraq fund chief calls for halt to Baghdad Metro project agbi.com
  2. HSS Engineers set for cashflow recovery ahead thestar.com.my
  3. Corruption clouds Iraq's ambitious Baghdad metro project newarab.com
  4. HSS Engineers bags RM1.5b contract for Baghdad Metro project themalaysianreserve.com