Evergrande lost ¥3.9bn on bottled water — then sold the brand for ¥1.8bn

China's largest property developer announced Evergrande Spring Water in November 2013 — premium bottled water backed by a national advertising blitz and celebrity endorsements, entering a category already dominated by Nongfu Spring and Wahaha.

The losses were brutal: net losses of ¥552m in 2013, ¥2.84bn in 2014 and ¥555m in January–May 2015 — about ¥3.95bn in just over two years.

On 28 September 2016 Evergrande announced it was selling the business: total consideration ¥2.7bn, of which the water brand went for ¥1.8bn to a Shenzhen car dealership and a Hong Kong company. Analysts blamed a crowded market, the absence of an experienced consumer-goods marketing leader, and an outdated promotional playbook.

Evergrande spent ¥3.95bn on ads and celebrity endorsements, but without distribution or FMCG expertise, it lost that sum in two years and sold the brand for ¥1.8bn.

A property giant entered a commodity market where it had no edge, spending on ads what incumbents had spent decades building in distribution.

The marketing playbook — heavy advertising and premium positioning — could not beat established rivals on price, taste and shelf space.

Without an experienced FMCG leadership team, the line burned cash for two years before the parent pulled the plug.

Evergrande spent its way into bottled water, lost ¥3.9bn in two years and sold the brand. Money and ads could not buy an edge in a commodity market.

Evergrande sold its food-and-drink businesses for ¥2.7bn in September 2016; the water brand went to Shenzhen car dealership Sanwei Dulin and Hong Kong's Lipu Limited for ¥1.8bn. The retreat closed a three-year, ¥3.9bn detour, and the water experiment became a footnote to Evergrande's real-estate empire.