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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2013–2025

Biyao Mall pioneered C2M e-commerce — the cash gap swallowed it

The first C2M platform paid factories 50% upfront and waited 45 days for payment. $30M in funding, 35M users, and one seized-up cash cycle later, it shut down.

Biyao Mall

What happened

Biyao Mall (必要商城) launched in 2013 as China's first C2M (Customer-to-Manufacturer) e-commerce platform, the brainchild of Bi Sheng, a Baidu co-founder. It connected consumers directly to factories that manufactured for brands like Prada and Armani, cutting out the middleman. By its peak, Biyao had accumulated 35 million registered users and a 99%+ satisfaction rate, and had run aggressive ad campaigns declaring "Goodbye Taobao, goodbye Pinduoduo."

The model worked for users but bled cash for the platform. Biyao prepaid factories 50% upfront, then waited up to 45 days for customers to confirm receipt and release payment. The gap between outgoing and incoming cash grew with every order. The company raised only $30 million across two funding rounds (a 2013 Series A of roughly $2 million and a 2015 A+ round of $30 million), and reportedly turned down a $1 billion valuation offer. Its debt-to-asset ratio hovered above 120%, far above the retail industry average of 70%.

The end came in May 2025. A core factory was fined 500,000 yuan for environmental violations, triggering 12 other suppliers to collectively demand 15-day payment terms. The move drained Biyao's remaining 80 million yuan ($11 million) in working capital instantly. Founder Bi Sheng posted an open letter on the Biyao app announcing the platform would "hibernate" — all operations suspended. Products were cleared from the app, and users were asked to refund unfinished orders. Executorship records exceeding 500,000 yuan were filed the same day.

Why it happened

  • A C2M platform that prepays suppliers and collects from customers weeks later is a financing business masquerading as a marketplace — the float only grows with scale and kills when it seizes up.
  • $30 million was not enough to sustain the working capital gap across 16 product categories; the model needed either higher gross margins or supply-chain financing that was never built.
  • Aggressive spending on elevator ads and subsidies (300 million yuan) compounded the cash drain, leaving the company with no buffer when suppliers tightened terms.
  • Passing on a $1B acquisition offer meant betting the company on a model that was never capital-efficient — Biyao kept running a business whose unit economics didn't work at scale.
What it cost$30M raised, 12-year run, 2025 hibernationcostly

The lesson

A marketplace that prepays its suppliers and collects from customers weeks later is a financing business disguised as a platform — if that is not your core skill, the float kills you as it grows.

Sources

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