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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 2016–2017

Investors lost ¥9.1B on a bus that ran 300 metres in a straight line

Huaying Kailai raised billions for a 'straddling bus' that could not turn, cross an intersection, or clear a bridge.

Huaying Kailai · TEB Technology Development

What happened

The Transit Elevated Bus was a 22-metre, 7.8-metre-wide electric vehicle designed to straddle two lanes of traffic while cars drove underneath. The concept, originally sketched by American architects in 1969, was revived by Shenzhen Hashi Future Parking Equipment Company and shown at the 2010 Beijing High-Tech Expo. Time magazine named it one of the 50 Best Inventions that year. No working prototype existed.

Around 2010, Beijing Huaying Kailai Asset Management bought the design from inventor Song Youzhou, registered TEB Technology Development, and began selling investment products tied to the project. The 'TEB Fund' carried a minimum subscription of ¥1 million. By 2016, Huaying Kailai had reportedly raised ¥9.1 billion ($1.3 billion) from investors, while the engineering remained unchanged: the bus could not navigate corners, crossroads, bridges, or traffic lights.

In August 2016, a single prototype — TEB-1, capacity 300 passengers — inched along a 300-metre track in Qinhuangdao, Hebei province. It did not turn. It did not stop at a light. People's Daily Online called it a 'complete scam' after Qinhuangdao officials said they had not authorised the test. By December the prototype sat rusting in an open barn. In June 2017 the city dismantled the track. Investors who sought redemptions at Huaying Kailai's Beijing headquarters near Chaoyangmen were not repaid.

Why it happened

  • A fundraising vehicle was built before the engineering was validated — the money preceded the machine by six years
  • The prototype test was designed to impress, not to validate: 300 metres, no turns, no intersections, no load testing
  • Investor products were sold on the strength of a concept render and a Time magazine list inclusion, with no independent technical review
  • Local government officials were not consulted, so the test had no regulatory cover and collapsed the moment journalists asked who had approved it
What it cost¥9.1B raised; investors unpaidcatastrophic

The lesson

If the prototype cannot do the thing the fundraising deck promises, the fundraising is the product — and the investors are the customers.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →