Back to the archive

The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 1936–2026

A 90-year-old department store has ¥137M cash against ¥3.9B of short-term debt

Nanjing's 1936 landmark stacked property debt on a department store. FY2025: ¥393M loss, a 97.14% debt ratio, and ¥393M of loans already overdue.

Central Mall Group (中央商场, 600280) · 2026-04-29

What happened

Central Mall opened in Nanjing's Xinjiekou on January 12, 1936, founded by a group of industrialists to sell Chinese-made goods, and listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2000. Over the decades it grew from the flagship into a chain of department stores across Jiangsu and beyond — Xuzhou's biggest state-run store joined in 2004 — and layered a property development business on top of retail, financed by rising borrowings.

The two layers broke together. First-half 2025 revenue fell 11.96% to ¥1.168 billion and the company swung to a loss; the annual report on April 29, 2026 showed full-year revenue down 6.99% to ¥2.137 billion and a loss of ¥393 million, widened from ¥148 million in 2024. Impairment ran to ¥134 million — ¥126 million on unsold development inventory, ¥8.2 million of goodwill. The Xuzhou store was shut as a 'strategic closure' with contract terminations, asset write-offs and lease penalties, and a subsidiary paid back taxes and late fees after self-inspection.

The balance sheet is the story: a 97.14% asset-liability ratio — ¥9.541 billion of debt against ¥9.824 billion of assets — and net assets down 60.54% in a year to ¥273 million. Cash stood at ¥137 million against ¥3.892 billion of short-term borrowings, of which ¥393 million was overdue, plus ¥1.262 billion of long-term debt falling due within the year. Unsold property dominates inventory: ¥3.932 billion after ¥739 million of accumulated writedowns. What still works is small: operating cash flow of ¥359 million, up 14.25%, and leasing income — 33.71% of revenue at a 99.55% gross margin.

Why it happened

  • The property business built beside the stores became the whole problem: ¥3.932 billion of unsold development inventory, written down ¥739 million, worth less than the debt that financed it.
  • Leverage outran the retailer that carried it — a 97.14% asset-liability ratio, ¥3.892 billion of short-term borrowings against ¥137 million of cash, and ¥393 million already overdue.
  • The core kept shrinking while the bill grew: FY2025 revenue fell 6.99%, the loss widened to ¥393 million, and the year's fixes — closing Xuzhou, paying back taxes — all cost money.
What it cost¥393M loss; ¥137M cash vs ¥3.892B short-term debtcostly

The lesson

A ninety-year-old department store borrowed to build property, and the property is now worth less than the debt beside it. Retail still throws off cash; the balance sheet no longer waits for it.

Aftermath

The annual report offers no rescue: ¥3.892 billion of short-term debt to roll against ¥137 million of cash, ¥1.26 billion more maturing within a year, and a property inventory that the market reprices faster than it can be sold. The stated path is the one every stressed regional retailer walks — shrink the department stores, defend the core Xinjiekou site, lean into leasing income with its 99.55% margin. Whether creditors roll the overdue ¥393 million while that happens is not in the company's hands.

Sources

spotted an error? The club wants to know.

Comments · 0

    Sign in to join the comments.

    More like this

    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →