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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2019–2025

Meituan spent 5 years and over ¥110B on group-buying — then shut it down

Meituan Youxuan left 19 provinces in June 2025 and shut its last markets by year-end, ending a group-buying push that had lost over ¥110B since 2019.

Meituan · 美团 · 美团优选 · 2025-06

What happened

Meituan Youxuan (美团优选) was Meituan's entry into community group-buying, a model where neighborhood 'group leaders' (团长) aggregated orders for next-day pickup of fresh produce and groceries at below-market prices. Between 2019 and 2024, Meituan's new-business segment — including Youxuan — accumulated over ¥110 billion in losses, with annual operating losses running ¥283.79 billion in 2022, ¥201.66 billion in 2023, and still ¥72.73 billion in 2024.

The business never found a stable unit economics: summer produce spoilage rates reached 20%, group leaders exploited management gaps for unauthorized fees and off-book sales, and price-sensitive customers showed little loyalty, switching group leaders or platforms over small discounts. Scale made it worse, not better — larger order volumes meant larger losses.

In June 2025, Meituan withdrew Youxuan from 19 provinces including Beijing and Sichuan, keeping only Guangdong and Zhejiang running. By the end of 2025, the company quietly shut down operations in those remaining core markets too, alongside terminating its 团好货 (Tuan Hao Huo) B2C offshoot in an internal announcement.

Meituan framed the closure as a redirection toward its stronger instant-retail and instant-delivery business, where consumer demand for immediacy — rather than next-day pickup — was proving durable. Rival Pinduoduo's Duoduo Maicai, which stayed in the category, reached roughly ¥3 trillion in GMV by November 2025, more than Meituan Youxuan and Pinduoduo's group-buying business combined had generated in 2024 — evidence that the category itself survived even as Meituan's attempt at it did not.

Why it happened

  • Group-buying's unit economics never worked at scale — larger order volumes brought higher spoilage and thinner margins, so growth increased losses instead of easing them.
  • Group leaders, the model's core distribution mechanism, had structural incentives to charge unauthorized fees and sell outside the platform, a gap Meituan never closed in five years.
  • Consumers switched between group leaders and platforms for small discounts, so the model built little of the loyalty needed to justify its fixed costs.
  • Instant retail's 30-minute delivery met the same immediacy demand more directly, making next-day pickup a worse-fit format for the underlying need.
What it costover ¥110B in cumulative new-business losses, 2019–2024costly

The lesson

A business model whose losses scale up with volume is not a growth problem to solve with more investment — five years and over ¥110 billion did not find the unit economics that would make it work.

Aftermath

Meituan exited community group-buying entirely by the end of 2025, redirecting resources into instant retail formats like Xiaoxiang Supermarket. Rival Pinduoduo's Duoduo Maicai remained the dominant national player in the category, reaching roughly ¥3 trillion in GMV by November 2025.

Sources

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