The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2003–2017
Jinqianbao (金钱豹) ruled China's buffets — then every store closed
The ¥238 luxury buffet grew to 26 stores and ~¥900M revenue; after two ownership changes the last store shut in 2017, and prepaid cards went worthless.
金钱豹 · Money Leopard · 2017-06
What happened
Jinqianbao (金钱豹) entered mainland China in Shanghai in October 2003 and defined the luxury buffet: halls of 7,000–8,000 square metres, over ¥10 million of renovation per store, a ¥238-per-person price and more than 400 dishes. At its peak after 2011 the chain ran 26 stores, served nearly 5 million customers a year and reached revenue of close to ¥900 million.
The founder sold to Apax Partners in July 2011 for ¥1.5 billion after a failed Hong Kong listing attempt. Under new owners the losses arrived — reported pre-tax losses of ¥224 million in 2013 and ¥208 million in 2014, then a ¥444 million loss reported in 2015 — and the chain changed hands again, Carnival International paying HK$253 million for it in 2015.
Collapse followed: 13 stores shut in 2016 alone, staff fell from 2,600 to 1,100, and by the end of that year only 13 locations remained. Twelve more closed in the first half of 2017; the last Beijing store shut in late June, and the Shanghai headquarters suspended business, leaving unpaid staff, unpaid suppliers and members holding prepaid cards with balances of ¥10,000 or more that nobody would honour.
Why it happened
- The luxury buffet's costs were fixed and its novelty was not: 7,000-square-metre halls needed packed rooms that stopped coming.
- Two owners in four years chased exits, not operations: bought for ¥1.5B, sold on for HK$253M, each inheriting a shrinking gate.
- Prepaid cards became the last debt: members' balances were spent as revenue, then stranded when the lights went out.
The lesson
Jinqianbao sold a ¥238 luxury buffet until the novelty aged; two owners later, 26 stores closed and members learned a prepaid card is only as good as the till behind it.
Aftermath
Jinqianbao remains China's standard case of the luxury buffet era's end, and of prepaid-card risk in catering.
Sources
- 界面新闻, 2017 — 最后一家金钱豹关门(2003年10月进入大陆市场;单店7000–8000平方米、装修超千万元;人均238元;巅峰26家店、年客流近500万、年营收近9亿元;2011年7月以15亿元卖给安佰深;2015年报亏4.44亿元;2015年嘉年华国际以2.53亿港元收购99.9999%股权;2016年关店13家、员工从2600减至1100;2017年6月底北京最后一家店关闭,上海总部停业;会员储值卡余额上万元无法使用)
- 新芽NewSeed(界面转载)— 金钱豹倒闭背后的自助餐如何实现自我拯救?(2003年进入中国;2011年冲刺港股上市未果后以15亿元卖给欧洲私募;巅峰26家店、400余道菜品;2013年起亏损,2013年税前亏损2.24亿元、2014年2.08亿元,净负债2013年3.27亿元、2014年4.4亿元;2016年12月31日仅剩13家;2017年上半年再关12家,仅剩上海总部一家)
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