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JD built Seven Fresh to counter Hema — 8 years on it closes stores and retreats

Seven Fresh took 8 years to build 71 stores. In mid-2026 it closed 5 in three months — big stores picked away from the communities that could fill them.

Seven Fresh (七鲜) · JD.com (京东) · 2026-07

What happened

Seven Fresh was JD's answer to Hema: founded in April 2017, a network fusing offline supermarkets with self-operated front warehouses. Eight years on it had built just 71 stores — roughly nine a year — with about 40 in Beijing, 10 in Tianjin and 10 in Guangzhou, and over 95% of locations in tier-1 and new tier-1 cities. It fought with price, pitching goods about 10% below competitors, even as management flagged the sustainability of profitability and rivals Hema and Dingdong only just turned profitable.

In mid-2026 the network shrank in its home market: five stores closed within three months — Beijing's Fengtai, Daxing and Fangshan districts, plus core Tianjin locations. The reasons were internal: single-store financial models that didn't clear the bar, leases expiring or rents outrunning revenue, and big-format sites chosen away from community living circles, with narrow customer bases whose revenue never covered rent, labor and cold-chain costs.

The retreat executes a focus set in 2022 — Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and the Greater Bay Area — now run as 'digging wells instead of casting nets': denser stores around mature communities, shorter delivery radii, lower spoilage. Seven Fresh also took over former RT-Mart space in Beijing, swapping one retreating format's shell for its own. For JD, the supermarket counterattack that began as a Hema challenger ends as a regional optimizer — eight years of capital for two regions, and a site-selection lesson paid in closed doors.

Why it happened

  • The store model was wrong for the site: big-format supermarkets placed away from community living circles drew narrow customer bases whose revenue couldn't cover rent, labor and cold chain.
  • Price was the only weapon — goods about 10% below rivals — while profitability stayed an open question; Hema and Dingdong turned profitable first.
  • Scale came too slowly to matter: ~9 stores a year for 8 years left Seven Fresh at 71 doors against rivals' citywide coverage, and the 2026 correction closed five in three months.
What it costFive stores closed in 3 months; network retreatingcostly

The lesson

A challenger built on price and capital dies by site selection. JD's Seven Fresh took 8 years to build 71 stores, closed five in three months — the big-format sites sat away from the communities.

Aftermath

The plan now is density over breadth: more stores around mature communities, shorter delivery radii, and Tianjin expansion rebuilt around warehouse-stores rather than big supermarkets. The 2025 plan to add 20 Tianjin warehouse-stores sits beside the 2026 closures of core-city doors — the network grows where the model works and retreats where it never did. Whether a two-region Seven Fresh can earn its keep inside JD's instant-retail war is the next reckoning.

Sources

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