The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Financial decision · 2017
Huoli Modeng (活力摩簦) ran shared umbrellas for four months, vanished with deposits in doubt
Launched August 2017 planning a million umbrellas on shareholder money alone; by December it had shut, and testers could not get deposits back.
活力摩簦 · 上海天伞网络科技有限公司 · 2017-12
What happened
活力摩簦 (Huoli Modeng) entered the shared-umbrella market in August 2017, with its founder announcing plans to deploy one million umbrellas within a year. In practice the service reached only two cities, Hangzhou and Shenzhen. No outside capital ever came in — the company ran on shareholder self-investment, with revenue resting on user deposits, first 99 yuan and later 39 yuan; advertising income from the umbrella canopies was zero.
By early December 2017 — four months after launch — the company had stopped operating. All employees completed resignation procedures and the office was emptied. Co-founder Yi Xinyu said funding could not keep up with development: the sharing economy needs massive scale to work, and investors in late 2017 wanted companies with cash profits, not burn. Reporters testing the service could neither end usage nor get a deposit refund.
The category around it was just as thin: by mid-2017 China had more than 15 shared-umbrella companies, but only a handful had raised anything, all at angel level, while shared power banks raised 1.2 billion yuan in 40 days. An umbrella's working life was estimated at two years, and rental fees alone could not pay for it. Most of the category faded within a year.
Why it happened
- A capital-hungry category entered without capital: scale is what makes sharing economics work, and Huoli Modeng had only shareholder money.
- Deposits were the business: with zero ad revenue and thin rental fees, the 39–99 yuan deposits were the main money in — a loan from users, not revenue.
- The fundraising window had closed: by late 2017 investors wanted profitable companies, and a two-city umbrella service could not show that.
The lesson
Deposits are a loan, not revenue. With no outside capital and nothing to sell but umbrella use, Huoli Modeng found in four months that the only money left was the users'.
Aftermath
The office emptied and staff left; users were pointed to SMS and WeChat channels for deposit refunds that reporters could not get to work. 活力摩簦 became one of the first named casualties of China's shared-umbrella boom.
Sources
- 界面新闻,2017-12-06 — 共享雨伞品牌"活力摩簦"已停止运营 员工均已离职(2017年8月正式投入市场,12月初结束运营;原计划一年投放100万把伞,实际只进入杭州、深圳两城;无外部资本,股东自投;押金99元后降为39元;伞面广告收入为零;联合创始人易新宇:资金跟不上发展;记者测试无法结束使用、无法退押金;员工全部离职,办公室已清空)
- 网易科技,2017-07-06 — 争议共享雨伞,创业者:质疑的人太肤浅(共享e伞投放30万把伞、媒体报道"全军覆没";oto首批几百把很快全部遗失;押金普遍29–50元;截至2017年7月十余家玩家仅5家拿到融资,均为天使轮)
- 界面新闻,2017-05-31 — 共享雨伞遭用户投资人冷眼 共享经济或将面临资本寒冬(行业15家以上公司,仅春笋、e伞、魔力伞完成天使轮;雨伞寿命最多两年,单靠租金难盈利;投资人作壁上观,同期共享充电宝40天融资12亿元;上海陆家嘴城管曾收缴挂在护栏上的共享雨伞)
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