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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 2022–2025

China's fruit king went from HK$67B to forced delisting in 40 months

Hongjiu IPO'd in 2022 as China's largest fruit distributor, peak value HK$67B. It never published its 2023 results; in December 2025 the exchange delisted it.

Hongjiu Fruit (洪九果品, 6689.HK) · 2025-12-30

What happened

Chongqing's Hongjiu Fruit listed in Hong Kong on September 5, 2022 at HK$40 — China's 'first fruit-distribution stock', the country's largest fruit and durian distributor. Revenue climbed from ¥2 billion to ¥15.08 billion in 2022 (+46.7%); net profit ¥1.45 billion (+398%). The engine was financial: full prepayment to orchards, long credit to supermarkets. By mid-2023 receivables stood at ¥9.35 billion against cash of ¥560 million, the collection cycle ran 188 days, and 2019-to-H1-2023 operating cash flow was ¥4.45 billion in the red. The market capitalisation peaked at HK$67.1 billion anyway.

The audit broke on the prepayments: ¥4.47 billion at end-2023, of which ¥3.42 billion went out in Q4 2023 alone to newly added suppliers with tiny registered capital and zero social-insurance staff — and another ¥1.52 billion followed to the same counterparties in January 2024. KPMG resigned; the 2023 annual results were never published; the share suspended on March 20, 2024. In April six executives including founder Deng Hongjiu were put under criminal measures on suspicion of loan fraud and false VAT invoices; three independent directors resigned on May 30.

On October 3, 2025 the Listing Committee ordered the delisting — investigation incomplete, management integrity in question, internal controls uncorrected, no results, no independent directors or company secretary; the review upheld it on December 15. At 9 a.m. on December 30, 2025, forty months after the IPO, Hongjiu lost its listing — last price HK$1.74, 95.65% below the offer; more than HK$64 billion had evaporated from the peak. Industrial Bank and China Merchants Bank had already sued over loans; total liabilities stood at ¥3.798 billion against ¥560 million of cash.

Why it happened

  • High prepayment upstream, long credit downstream: revenue grew but the cash never came back — ¥4.45 billion of operating outflow 2019 to H1 2023, ¥9.35 billion of receivables against ¥560 million.
  • ¥3.42 billion went in one quarter to new suppliers too small to be real, and the payments continued after the auditor questioned them — the books became unauditable, and KPMG resigned.
  • Governance collapse finished it: offices sealed, six executives under criminal measures, every independent director gone — nobody was left who could publish results or answer the exchange.
What it costHK$64B gone; delisted 40 months after IPOcatastrophic

The lesson

Hongjiu's revenue grew sevenfold, but every yuan consumed cash: prepay upstream, extend credit downstream. When the auditor asked about ¥3.4 billion paid to shell-shaped suppliers, the listing fell.

Aftermath

The reorganization application sits with the Chongqing court. Behind the shell questions is a real asset base — 16 processing plants in Thailand and Vietnam, 60 sorting centers — but no board, no audited accounts and a leadership under criminal measures. The industry has moved against it too: premium fruit prices fell around 15% a year from 2020 as domestic substitution reached about 60%. IPO to forced delisting in 40 months is the fastest arc in China's fresh-food sector; the reorganization's question is whether the durian supply chain is worth more inside a broken company than outside it.

Sources

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