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The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2021–2025

Gome went from China's #1 electronics retailer to ¥538M revenue — 4,032 stores lost

Gome was China's largest electronics chain with 4,195 stores. By 2025 revenue was ¥538M and 4,032 stores were gone — a 96% reduction in 4 years.

Gome Retail · 国美零售 · 2025-12

What happened

Gome was once the most powerful retailer in China. Founded in 1987, it dominated the electronics retail market through aggressive pricing and rapid expansion. By 2010 it operated over 1,200 stores and was locked in a duopoly with Suning. In 2008 its founder was removed from leadership, and the company never found a successor who could restore its former strength.

The decline accelerated dramatically after 2021. E-commerce from JD.com and Alibaba had already eroded foot traffic, but the pandemic dealt a final blow. Gome attempted a pivot to online retail and livestream commerce, but these efforts failed to generate meaningful revenue. The company's store count collapsed from 4,195 in 2021 to just 163 by the end of 2024 — a loss of over 4,000 locations in three years.

By 2025, the business that once generated over ¥70 billion in annual revenue was reporting just ¥538 million in sales. Gross profit was a mere ¥25 million, representing a 4.65% margin. The company lost ¥59.44 billion that year, a slight improvement from ¥116.29 billion in 2024 but still catastrophic relative to its revenue base. Cumulative losses over the decline period exceeded ¥200 billion.

Gome's collapse is the most dramatic retail decline in modern Chinese business history. From China's top electronics chain with thousands of stores and a market cap of over HK$100 billion, it became a company with fewer than 200 locations, near-zero sales momentum, and losses that dwarfed its revenue.

Why it happened

  • Gome never recovered from the 2008 departure of its founder — successive management teams could not replace his strategic vision or retail instincts.
  • The electronics retail format was disrupted by e-commerce (JD.com, Alibaba), and Gome had no answer to online pricing and convenience.
  • Gome's attempted digital transformation and livestream pivot failed — the company could not build an online presence that competed with platforms owning the customer relationship.
  • Store network collapse became self-reinforcing: fewer stores meant less purchasing power with suppliers, worse pricing, and even fewer customers.
What it costRevenue ¥70B→¥538M; stores 4,195→163; loss ¥59.4B/yrcostly

The lesson

When a retailer loses direction and cannot build online, closures accelerate into a death spiral — fewer stores, worse terms, fewer customers. Gome was too broken to recover.

Aftermath

Gome Retail continued to operate as a listed company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (00493.HK). The company's market cap had fallen to under HK$1 billion by early 2026. It explored various restructuring options, including potential asset sales and strategic investments, but its core retail business showed no sign of recovery. Suppliers had largely cut ties, and consumer awareness of the brand had diminished to near zero among younger shoppers. Gome's former rival Suning faced a similar though less severe decline, having been rescued by a state-owned consortium in 2021.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →