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Evergrande's EV arm raised HK$30bn on a 1-million-car promise, then built about 1,700

China Evergrande's EV arm used a backdoor Hong Kong listing to raise billions for a car company with almost no cars, then followed its parent into insolvency.

China Evergrande New Energy Vehicle Group · China Evergrande Group · 2021-01-24

What happened

China Evergrande's health-and-wellness unit had reached the Hong Kong market by acquiring a listed shell in 2015. In 2019 the property giant redirected that listed vehicle into electric vehicles, unveiling the Hengchi brand and a plan to spend 45 billion yuan over three years building 10 global manufacturing bases and reaching 1 million units of annual production within three to five years — before it had sold a single car.

The pivot raised real money on the strength of that promise. Tencent, Sequoia Capital, Yunfeng Fund and Didi Chuxing put in HK$4 billion in September 2020; four months later, on January 24, 2021, six more investors bought a further HK$26 billion (about $3.35 billion) of shares at HK$27.3 each, and the unit was renamed China Evergrande New Energy Vehicle Group. Fourteen Hengchi models were announced; six reached the launch stage.

Production never caught up with the capital. By 2023 the company had built only about 1,700 cars and reported a 12 billion yuan loss for the year alone, on top of tens of billions more lost since the 2019 pivot. Its Tianjin plant halted production entirely in early 2024, and a local authority ordered it to refund roughly 1.9 billion yuan ($262 million) in state subsidies after it failed to meet the production, sales and headquarters commitments those subsidies were tied to.

China Evergrande Group's broader collapse pulled the EV unit down with it. Trading in Evergrande NEV shares was suspended on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on April 1, 2025 after it missed its filing deadline, with a compliance deadline of September 30, 2026 before automatic delisting; creditors including Zhejiang Chint Electrics separately filed to liquidate operating subsidiaries over unpaid debts.

Why it happened

  • A capital-raising machine was mistaken for an industrial one: a listed shell could sell shares on a story faster than a car company could build factories and validate a production line.
  • The 1-million-unit target set the fundraising ambition before any model had shipped in volume, so each new placement financed promises rather than proven output.
  • The unit depended on its property-developer parent for cash and credibility; once the parent became insolvent, the EV arm lost both its funding source and any path to the capital a real ramp-up needs.
  • Local governments extended production subsidies against contractual delivery targets; when the targets were missed, the money came back due on top of the losses already booked.
What it costHK$30bn+ raised; ~1,700 cars built; shares suspendedcatastrophic

The lesson

A stock listing can raise money faster than a factory can build cars. Setting the fundraising target before the line is proven finances the story instead of closing the gap.

Aftermath

Evergrande NEV's shares remained suspended on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as of 2025, with a September 30, 2026 deadline to comply with resumption guidance or face delisting. Operating subsidiaries faced separate creditor-driven liquidation and bankruptcy petitions, and the company said in 2025 it had been unable to secure new strategic investors to keep operations funded.

Sources

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    Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →