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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 2007–2009

Cemex paid $15B for Rinker weeks before the crash — and nearly defaulted on the debt

The biggest acquisition in cement history closed in June 2007, financed with debt. A year later the construction market collapsed, and the bill came due.

Cemex · Rinker Group

What happened

Cemex was Mexico's cement champion and one of the world's most acquisitive builders: a string of purchases in Spain, the UK, the US and Venezuela had made it one of the three largest cement companies on Earth. In October 2006 it announced its biggest deal yet — Australia's Rinker Group, for $12.8 billion. Rinker's board held out, and by April 2007 Cemex had raised its offer to $14.2 billion. The deal closed in June, financed with debt, at what Forbes later called the tail end of the building boom.

The timing could not have been worse, and the structure could not have been more fragile. Housing starts in the United States — Rinker's main market — collapsed, and with them the revenues that were supposed to service the acquisition debt. A falling Mexican peso and losing derivative bets widened the hole in 2008. By mid-2009 Cemex carried about $18 billion in debt, was in its second round of refinancing talks with its banks, and analysts were openly discussing default risk.

The unwind took years. The US Department of Justice had already forced the divestiture of more than forty plants on antitrust grounds; then came the sales — the Australian operations Cemex had just bought went to Holcim for $1.6 billion, a fraction of what Rinker had cost. Pieces of the acquisition were still being sold a decade later: the Rinker Materials pipe business went to Quikrete in 2016 for $500 million. The assets remained; the price paid for them was never recovered.

Why it happened

  • The bid rose from $12.8B to $14.2B because the target's board held out — auction discipline failed at exactly the moment the cycle was turning.
  • A debt-financed acquisition of a cyclical business is a bet that the cycle will hold; US housing starts fell within a year of closing.
  • Currency and derivative exposures turned a bad acquisition into a balance-sheet crisis — the peso move hit debt service the deal itself had created.
What it cost$18B debt, years of asset salescostly

The lesson

In a cyclical business, the price you can pay at the top of the cycle is the price the worst year cannot service — bid against the downturn, not against the other bidder.

Sources

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