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The encyclopedia · Trading & Investing · Financial decision · 2007

Two Bear Stearns hedge funds hid subprime exposure — and $1.8B of it vanished

Managers told investors their funds held 6-8% subprime debt while actual exposure was near 60%. Margin calls in 2007 wiped both out; investor losses hit $1.8B.

Bear Stearns · 2007-07-31

What happened

Bear Stearns Asset Management ran two hedge funds, the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund and a higher-leverage sibling, the Enhanced Leverage Fund, that bet heavily on collateralized debt obligations built from subprime mortgage-backed securities. Portfolio managers Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin told investors in monthly summaries that direct subprime exposure ran about 6-8% of each portfolio. The SEC later found that once the funds had collapsed, Bear's own sales force was told the true combined direct and indirect exposure was roughly 60%.

As the funds took losses through early 2007 and redemption requests mounted, Cioffi released preliminary April results projecting essentially flat returns; the final numbers weeks later showed an actual loss of 5.09% for the High-Grade fund and 18.97% for the Enhanced Leverage fund. Tannin told investors he was personally adding to his own stake as a buying opportunity and mocked one investor who wanted to redeem instead — while Cioffi was privately pulling $2 million, over a third of his own investment, into a different fund he knew was betting against subprime.

By late July 2007, the Enhanced Leverage fund's value had been effectively wiped out and the High-Grade fund could not meet a margin call on a $1.3 billion credit facility; Bear Stearns seized the fund's collateral and began an orderly liquidation. Both funds filed for bankruptcy protection at the end of July, with the SEC later putting total investor losses at approximately $1.8 billion. Cioffi and Tannin were indicted on fraud charges in 2008. The collapse was an early tremor of the subprime crisis that forced Bear Stearns itself into a sale to JPMorgan Chase eight months later.

Why it happened

  • Reporting subprime exposure at 6-8% while actual exposure ran near 60% meant investors were pricing the funds' risk on numbers that bore no relation to the portfolio they actually held.
  • Releasing flattering preliminary estimates ahead of much worse final numbers bought the managers time to raise new money and discourage redemptions, but it only delayed the reckoning by weeks.
  • Leverage on top of concentrated subprime exposure meant that once the CDOs lost value, the funds had no cushion — a margin call the fund could not meet triggered the seizure that ended both.
What it cost~$1.8B in investor lossescostly

The lesson

A fund's risk disclosures are only as good as the gap between what managers tell investors and what they hold — Bear Stearns quoted 6-8% subprime exposure while running near 60%.

Sources

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