What happened
During the 1997-98 Asian crisis, Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (BDNI) survived deposit runs on emergency Bank Indonesia liquidity support (BLBI) that reached about Rp17.4tn in early 1998 and Rp27.6tn by mid-1998. The bank's loan book showed why it needed rescuing: of Rp16.9tn in credit outstanding, 76 percent went to companies owned by or linked to controlling shareholder Sjamsul Nursalim - roughly 50 times the connected-party lending limit of 20 percent of its Rp1.3tn reported capital.
When BDNI was wound down, its debt to the government via the bank-restructuring agency BPPN totalled Rp47.3tn: Rp30.9tn of BLBI, Rp7.1tn of deposits and loans, Rp4.7tn owed to Bank Indonesia under a guarantee scheme and Rp4.6tn of other credit. Sjamsul was named a suspect in October 2000 with the loss estimated at Rp7.28tn. A settlement was struck at Rp28.4tn over four years; shares in his group were booked at Rp27.4tn, but BPPN's own review concluded the assets would realistically fetch only 20-25 percent of the debt.
By March 2004 Sjamsul had paid Rp1tn and handed over assets including Gajah Tunggal Tyre and the Dipasena shrimp farms. On 26 April 2004 BPPN issued a Surat Keterangan Lunas - a formal release and discharge - declaring the Rp28.4tn settled, and the Attorney General's office ended his criminal case in July 2004. The agency chief who signed the release, Syafruddin Arsyad Tumenggung, was later convicted of corruption over the settlement letters and sentenced to 13 years, raised to 15 on appeal.
The conviction did not hold: the Supreme Court freed Syafruddin on cassation, ruling the settlement letters no crime, and rejected the KPK's review in 2020. A BPK audit put the state loss from the arrangement at Rp4.58tn. Sjamsul and his wife Itjih, suspects again in the revived case, stayed in Singapore beyond the reach of summons even with Interpol and Singapore's CPIB assisting.
What it cost
BDNI owed the state Rp47.3tn; BPK later put the loss from the release at Rp4.58tn and Rp4tn was still uncollected in 2022
Why it happened
BDNI ran its loan book as a private treasury: three quarters of credit went to the owner's own group, about 50 times the legal connected-party cap.
The crisis rescue converted the bank's losses into Rp47.3tn of state claims without the state ever taking control of the collateral backing them.
The 2004 settlement accepted the borrower's own asset valuations, which BPPN's review found worth only 20-25 percent of face value on a realisable basis.
Release letters and successive case terminations - 2004 and again in 2021 - let the file age out while recovery of the outstanding balance stalled.
The lesson
A settlement that books collateral at the borrower's own valuation turns bank fraud into a discount coupon. If assets fetch 20-25 cents on the dollar, the release letter writes off the rest.
Aftermath
On 31 March 2021 the KPK issued its first-ever SP3 case termination, citing its new two-year case rule, ending the criminal side again. The task force collecting BLBI debts booked Rp517.72bn from Sjamsul by June 2022 - but as shareholder of a different obligor, ex-Bank Dewa Rutji. The finance ministry confirmed in June 2022 that about Rp4tn on the BDNI obligation remained uncollected, the same month his fugitive status was formally ended.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- Kisah Dua Dekade Sjamsul Nursalim kompas.id
- Kisah Sjamsul Nursalim: Buron di Negeri Singa kini Tak Lagi Tersangka news.detik.com
- Kasus BLBI Sjamsul Nursalim Disetop, SP3 Pertama KPK cnnindonesia.com
- Status Buron Sjamsul Nursalim dan Istri Sudah Berakhir news.detik.com
- Utang BLBI Sjamsul Nursalim Rp4 Triliun Ternyata Belum Lunas ekonomi.bisnis.com