What happened
Aiways was founded in February 2017 by Fu Qiang, a former executive at Mercedes-Benz, Audi and Volvo China. It was among the first Chinese EV startups to reach volume production, building the U5 (launched December 2019) in a 150,000-unit plant in Shangrao, Jiangxi, and among the first to sell in Europe. The cars barely sold: 2,600 units in 2020, 3,011 in 2021, 2,824 in the first eight months of 2022. The U6, launched in October 2022, changed nothing.
In 2019 the company made its defining capital bet: a mixed-ownership deal taking 50% of Jiangling Holdings for RMB 1.747 billion — at the time the highest price any EV startup had paid for a production license, ahead of WM Motor and Li Auto. The license could not fix demand: the Landwind relaunch it was meant to enable never materialized, and Aiways gave up its stake in June 2021, while still selling about three thousand cars a year.
The end came in the 2023 price war. A September 2022 letter of intent for a US reverse merger at a $5–6 billion valuation never progressed. Payroll slipped off schedule from February 2023; a May 10 notice delayed April wages a second month. On May 6 the Yangpu headquarters told staff to work from home for system maintenance — employees said the building had been powered off over unpaid rent and utilities. Soon after, the owner app went silent: maintenance packages, lifetime warranty rights and vehicle-to-load accessories were all cleared.
What it cost
About RMB 1.75B sunk into a production license for ~3,000 sales a year; by mid-2023 staff had gone unpaid since March and the Shanghai HQ was closed over rent arrears
Why it happened
The product had no hook — Jiemian called Aiways competent and forgettable, a brand that never found the one trait the market would remember.
Capital went to inputs before demand: a record RMB 1.747 billion license deal and a 150,000-unit plant served products selling roughly 3,000 units a year.
The exit was postponed onto imaginary rescues — a $5–6B SPAC valuation in 2022 with no follow-through while cash ran out.
Timing: Tesla and BYD fired the 2023 price war, raising the cash cushion needed to survive exactly when Aiways had none.
The lesson
A production license is an input, not a moat. Aiways bought the priciest one in NEV history while its cars had no trait anyone remembered; when the price war came, the license could not pay salaries.
Aftermath
Yicai reported on May 11, 2023 that management was raising money and would repay all withheld wages once funds arrived; no rescue was announced. The same month its peers were failing in view — Enovate had halted production in March, WM Motor had stalled, and Mitsubishi suspended new-car production in China. With 148 brands fighting for a market where the top 20% held over 90% of sales, analysts expected the weak to be absorbed or to quit China entirely. Aiways' app stayed dark and its offices stayed closed.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE
The sources
- 爱驰汽车连续两月欠薪,2023年将迎弱势车企淘汰潮? yicai.com
- App陷沉默、工资拖欠,爱驰汽车找不到服务区 stcn.com
- 爱驰“割肉”退出江铃控股,陆风汽车重组失败原因何在? m.sohu.com