A loose cam jammed an A220's throttle in flight — Transport Canada ordered replacements

An Airbus A220 flight crew was left unable to reduce power on the aircraft's left engine after a component inside the throttle quadrant came loose in flight. Transport Canada traced the malfunction to a manufacturing defect in the thrust reverser lockout mechanism: the joint securing the lockout cam had not received sufficient torque during manufacturing, letting the cam detach and interfere with movement of the thrust lever, which stuck at a high engine-power setting.

Transport Canada warned that a similar malfunction could cause loss of thrust control, an in-flight engine shutdown, or potentially loss of the aircraft. The resulting directive, CF-2026-49, effective October 22, 2026, covers both the A220-100 and A220-300. Operators must replace affected throttle quadrant assemblies within 1,100 flight hours, and installation of affected units is prohibited from October 22. The order does not ground the fleet: aircraft without the identified components are untouched, and previously corrected assemblies may qualify as serviceable.

The directive does not identify the airline involved, when the incident occurred, or how the crew handled it. Airbus Canada had issued Service Bulletin BD500-761001 on June 16, 2026 with instructions for removing and replacing the affected assemblies; the Transport Canada directive makes the corrective work mandatory for aircraft operating under Canadian airworthiness requirements, and the directive is also listed in EASA's airworthiness database under the agency's adoption procedures.

Directive CF-2026-49, effective October 22, 2026: affected throttle quadrants must be replaced within 1,100 flight hours, and affected units can no longer be installed

The joint securing the thrust reverser lockout cam received insufficient torque during manufacturing, letting the cam detach inside the throttle quadrant in flight.

The detached cam obstructed thrust-lever movement, leaving the crew unable to pull the left lever back from its high-power position.

Transport Canada identified the failure as a manufacturing quality issue rather than normal wear, originating in the assembly used to position the cockpit thrust levers.

Regulators judged the worst case severe enough to mandate replacement: potential loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or loss of the aircraft.

Torque is a two-second step that never shows up in the brochure: one under-tightened joint can strand a thrust lever at high power in flight.

Directive CF-2026-49 takes effect October 22, 2026, giving operators up to 1,100 flight hours to replace affected assemblies while banning new installations of affected units. Operators must review aircraft records to determine whether affected throttle quadrants are installed; Airbus Canada's June 2026 service bulletin supplies the replacement procedure, and EASA's airworthiness database lists the directive under its adoption procedures.