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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 2023

A ₩17T run hit Korea's community banks — the first in twelve years

MG Saemaul Geumgo lost about ₩17 trillion of deposits in July 2023 as PF loan delinquencies surfaced, forcing bad-loan sales and joint supervision.

MG Saemaul Geumgo · 2023-07-06

What happened

MG Saemaul Geumgo, Korea's network of community credit cooperatives, held ₩290.7 trillion of assets and ₩259.4 trillion of deposits while lending heavily into real estate project finance. By the end of June 2023 its overall delinquency rate had reached 5.41%, up 1.82 points in a year, with corporate loans at 8.34%; the first half of 2023 produced a ₩123.6 billion net loss.

Then came the run. In July 2023 about ₩17 trillion of deposits was withdrawn, in Korea's first bank run in twelve years: 417,367 fixed-term deposits and installment savings were cancelled early, more than double a year earlier, and depositors gave up ₩377.3 billion of interest to get out. On 6 July the government formed a joint response team — interior and finance ministries, the FSC, the FSS and the Bank of Korea — to monitor flows and provide liquidity, reassuring customers that deposits up to the ₩50 million protection limit were safe.

The clean-up priced the damage: up to ₩3 trillion of delinquent loans were slated for sale in the second half of 2023, ₩2 trillion to KAMCO; loss-absorption coverage on real-estate and construction corporate loans was raised to 130%; and individual credit unions were barred from handling large corporate loans without the central association. Net inflows resumed in August, but the run had exposed a supervisory blind spot: the network sat outside direct FSS oversight, and a post-crisis agreement split soundness supervision between financial regulators and the interior ministry.

Why it happened

  • Community deposit funding had been lent into commercial project finance — a risk and duration mismatch that stayed invisible while property prices rose.
  • The network operated in a supervisory gap outside direct FSS oversight, so delinquency built without corrective pressure.
  • High-rate deposits raised in late 2022 gave the first wave of the run its motive: those were the holders with the most to move.
What it cost~₩17T withdrawn; ₩3T bad loans sold offcostly

The lesson

Depositor trust renews quietly every day and withdraws loudly all at once. When the loan book sours, the gap between what is owed and what is supervised decides how fast the money leaves.

Sources

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