JD spent ¥46.6B in one year to buy 15% of China's food-delivery market

JD entered food delivery in 2025 and lit the subsidy war. CEO Xu Ran called it a strategic layout: build user perception in 'quality food delivery' and take market share. The motive was partly defensive — JD's instant retail had been losing to Meituan's flash-purchase business on volume and profit, and its core daily-needs and 3C categories looked exposed. Early signals were promising: nearly 50% of early food-delivery users converted to JD's other businesses. The cost landed in a segment called 'new business'.

The Q3 report in mid-November 2025 showed the war's quarterly price: group revenue up 14.9% to ¥299.059 billion, but net profit down from ¥11.7 billion to ¥5.3 billion. New business lost ¥15.736 billion against ¥15.59 billion of revenue — nearly erasing the ¥14.8 billion operating profit of the retail arm that funded it — and marketing spend more than doubled to ¥21.1 billion. The segment's unit economics ran at ¥2 of cost for every ¥1 of revenue. On March 5, 2026 the full-year reckoning: ¥46.6 billion of new-business losses and group marketing up 75% to ¥84 billion.

What the money bought: over 240 million users placing orders in year one, and more than 15% of the market. Q4 showed the toll — revenue up just 1.5%, adjusted net profit down 90% to ¥1.1 billion, and an attributable net loss of ¥2.7 billion against a ¥9.9 billion profit a year earlier. For 2026, management wants 30% market share while keeping total food-delivery investment below the 2025 peak, saying losses are already narrowing quarter by quarter. The war continues at a lower burn.