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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 2018

IL&FS owed Rs 91,000 crore — and its default nearly sank India's shadow banks

IL&FS financed long-term infrastructure with short-term borrowing. When it defaulted in September 2018, the panic spread across India's NBFCs and mutual funds.

IL&FS · 2018-09

What happened

IL&FS — Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services — was one of India's largest non-banking finance companies, a 'shadow bank' that funded long-term infrastructure projects. It did what many NBFCs do: it borrowed short-term, through commercial paper and short-dated debt, and lent long-term, into roads and projects that would pay back over many years. By 2018 the group's total debt stood at about Rs 91,000 crore, more than half of it from public-sector lenders.

The model broke in late August and early September 2018. IL&FS Financial Services first defaulted on commercial paper, then defaulted on a Rs 1,000 crore short-term loan to a state lender, triggering downgrades across almost all of its debt. Because mutual funds and other NBFCs held large amounts of this paper, the trouble did not stay contained.

Contagion spread fast. By mid-September it had reached mutual funds and the debt market; a fire-sale of another NBFC's paper sent the BSE Sensex crashing by about 1,500 points, and liquid funds saw huge outflows as investors fled shadow-bank debt. The government told the National Company Law Tribunal that the collapse of IL&FS could pull down many mutual-fund companies with it. On 1 October 2018 the NCLT allowed the government to take control and install a new board, chaired by Uday Kotak, which submitted a revival plan within the month.

IL&FS is the case that exposed the fragility at the heart of the shadow-banking model. Borrowing short to lend long works until one default makes every lender look at every other NBFC — and then the maturity mismatch stops being one company's problem and becomes the whole system's.

Why it happened

  • IL&FS financed long-term infrastructure with short-term commercial paper and debt — a maturity mismatch that depends on always being able to roll over borrowing.
  • Defaults in late August and early September 2018 triggered downgrades across its debt, and the group carried about Rs 91,000 crore in total.
  • Because mutual funds and other NBFCs held its paper, the default became contagion: a fire-sale crashed the Sensex by ~1,500 points and triggered large outflows from liquid funds.
  • The government had to take control through the NCLT on 1 October 2018 and install a new board to manage an orderly resolution rather than a disorderly collapse.
What it costRs 91,000 crore debt; a sector-wide credit crunchcatastrophic

The lesson

Borrowing short to lend long works until one default makes lenders look at everyone else. IL&FS's Rs 91,000 crore of debt froze a whole sector; the mismatch was the system's, not just its own.

Aftermath

The IL&FS crisis tightened credit across India's entire NBFC sector for years, raised the cost of funding for shadow banks, and forced a fundamental rethink of how non-banking lenders are regulated and monitored. Its resolution under a government-appointed board ran on for years through the NCLT. The case is now the standard reference for systemic risk in shadow banking: the failure that mattered was not that one company borrowed too much, but that everyone had borrowed the same way.

Sources

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