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I-35W bridge collapsed at rush hour — 0.5-inch gusset plates, a 40-year-old design error

A 1960s design error used gusset plates half the thickness needed. On August 1, 2007, the bridge collapsed into the river, killing 13 and injuring 145.

Minnesota Department of Transportation · URS Corporation · Sverdrup & Parcel · 2007-08

What happened

The I-35W Mississippi River bridge was a steel deck truss bridge designed in the early 1960s and opened in 1967 as a key Minneapolis artery carrying 140,000 vehicles daily. The original design contained a fatal error: the gusset plates connecting the truss members were only 0.5 inches thick — roughly half the thickness needed for the loads the bridge carried. The design met 1961 AASHTO specifications, but the error was never caught during design review, construction, or four decades of inspections.

By August 1, 2007, the bridge carried far more than its original design loads. A 20% increase in concrete deck weight had been added over the years. That afternoon, 578,000 pounds of sand, water tanks, vehicles, and construction equipment sat in four closed lanes during a resurfacing project. At 6:05 PM CDT, during rush hour, the south-center gusset plates on two truss nodes failed simultaneously. The entire 1,907-foot span dropped into the river in seconds — 13 people died and 145 were injured.

The NTSB investigation concluded that the primary cause was a design error in the original 1960s gusset plates. The bridge had been rated structurally deficient since 1990 due to corrosion in its bearings, and was inspected annually — but inspectors checked individual members and never flagged the gusset plate thickness. MnDOT had planned a reinforcement project in December 2006 but canceled it two months later. The replacement bridge opened September 18, 2008 at a cost of $234 million, three months ahead of schedule.

Why it happened

  • The bridge's 0.5-inch gusset plates were half the thickness needed. The 1960s design error was never caught — not during design, construction, or 40 years of annual inspections.
  • By 2007 the bridge carried 20% more concrete weight than designed, plus 578,000 pounds of construction equipment during resurfacing — the gusset plates could not handle the combined load.
  • The bridge was rated structurally deficient since 1990 and inspected yearly, but inspectors never flagged the gusset plates — they checked individual members, not the connections between them.
  • MnDOT planned a reinforcement project in December 2006 but canceled it two months before the collapse. 13 people died and 145 were injured in a disaster that was entirely preventable.
What it cost13 dead; 145 injured; $234M replacement bridgecatastrophic

The lesson

A bridge's strength is not in its individual members but in how they connect. Four decades of inspections missed the gusset plates. What you do not check can kill you.

Aftermath

The I-35W bridge collapse was a landmark in US infrastructure safety. The NTSB investigation took 15 months and recommended gusset plate inspections on similar truss bridges nationwide. The replacement bridge opened 13 months later, three months ahead of schedule. MnDOT settled victim lawsuits for $52 million. The collapse accelerated national discussions about $5 trillion in deferred infrastructure maintenance and became a catalyst for renewed inspection standards nationwide.

Sources

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