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The encyclopedia · Finance & Accounting · Financial decision · 2024

Haitong's overseas arm lost HK$6.5B — then the firm was merged away

Haitong International lost HK$6.54B in 2022 on its investment book. The parent took it private, then was itself merged into Guotai Junan.

Haitong Securities · 2024-01-11

What happened

Haitong International Securities Group — the Hong Kong-listed overseas arm, roughly 68% held by Haitong Securities — ran wealth management, corporate finance and a large investment book. In 2022 the book broke: net investment losses reached HK$5.10 billion, with investment securities written down HK$5.60 billion; impairment charges took HK$1.59 billion across margin financing, term loans and amortised-cost securities; finance costs ran to HK$1.35 billion. The year ended in a HK$6.54 billion loss against a HK$300.8 million profit in 2021, and the accounts carried a going-concern note.

The parent kept the unit alive with support letters, US$200 million of perpetual subordinated securities in March 2023 and a planned HK$1.0–1.5 billion rights issue — none of which restored the franchise. In October 2023 Haitong Securities offered HK$3.45 billion, about US$443 million, to take the unit private; the scheme became effective on 9 January 2024 and the shares were delisted on 11 January. At the parent, FY2023 profit collapsed about 85% to RMB 1.01 billion, which Haitong attributed to falling valuations of overseas financial assets.

The reckoning completed a year later: FY2024 brought Haitong Securities its first annual loss, roughly RMB 3.4 billion, again blamed on overseas asset values. On 5 September 2024 the firm halted trading to announce absorption into Guotai Junan; regulators approved the deal in January 2025 and Haitong's A-shares left the Shanghai exchange weeks later. The merged Guotai Haitong debuted as China's largest brokerage by assets, with CNY 1.7 trillion — the exit price of one firm's overseas bet.

Why it happened

  • The investment book was funded with HK$47 billion of bank borrowings and issued debt, so every mark-down on securities landed on a leveraged balance sheet.
  • When the book turned, every credit line was hit at once — margin financing, term loans, amortised-cost bonds — HK$1.59 billion of impairment in one year.
  • Parent support bought time, not a franchise: letters of support, perpetuals and a rights issue could not replace the lost earnings power.
  • The parent carried the subsidiary's losses to the end — by FY2024 the overseas writedowns had consumed the whole firm.
What it costHK$6.54B loss; taken private; firm merged awaycostly

The lesson

A brokerage that lends its own balance sheet to the market ends up holding the market's worst assets. Support letters buy time; only the marks decide when it runs out.

Sources

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