The encyclopedia · Strategy & Leadership · Strategic decision · 2021–2024
FORTUNE: Tokyo watch trader collapsed on other people's credit cards
FORTUNE paid individuals to buy luxury watches abroad on their own credit cards. In July 2024 it went bankrupt owing ~¥1bn to ~60 creditors.
FORTUNE · 2024-07
What happened
FORTUNE was founded in May 2021 in Shibuya, Tokyo, with ¥1 million of capital, as a buyer and seller of luxury watches and gold. Instead of sourcing stock itself, it built its purchasing on other people's credit: the company recruited individuals — 'buyers' — to go to designated watch shops in Thailand and Hong Kong, buy Rolex and other models with their own credit cards, and hand the watches over, on a promise of reimbursement plus a 5–6% commission. Travel was paid, and buyers earned referral fees for recruiting friends into the same arrangement.
The scheme worked until the money stopped. Payments to buyers ran normally until around October 2023, then stopped in November 2023, with the company saying it could not prepare settlement funds. The man who actually ran the operation — not the registered director — became unreachable and never attended creditors' meetings. Buyers were left carrying the card bills themselves; their chargeback requests were rejected because they had signed the purchase receipts, and some had also lent cash at 5% monthly interest.
On 17 July 2024 the Tokyo District Court issued a bankruptcy commencement order on a quasi-self-bankruptcy petition by the director, with expected liabilities of about ¥1 billion (some reports say ¥600 million or more) against roughly 60 creditors. The claim deadline was set for 14 August 2024.
The aftermath spread the damage. A Tokyo Shoko Research follow-up in July 2025 found that about a third of the roughly 60 unpaid buyers had filed for personal bankruptcy themselves — one carried ¥13 million of card debt and was being sued by card companies. TSR describes the arrangement as a suspected Ponzi scheme built on the misuse of individuals' credit limits.
Why it happened
- The model depended on other people's credit: buyers fronted purchases on their own cards and waited for reimbursement — one missed payment turned customers into debtors.
- Scale came from recruiting more buyers with referral fees — growth raised the monthly reimbursement bill faster than the watches could be resold.
- No capital buffer: with ¥1M of capital and no reserves, the moment payments stopped the whole structure froze — and the man running it disappeared instead of facing creditors.
The lesson
A buying operation built on other people's credit must be repaid every month. When FORTUNE could not pay, its suppliers were the buyers themselves — and they took the bankruptcy.
Sources
- 東京商工リサーチ (TSR) Data Insight — 時計買い取りビジネスで破産の株式会社FORTUNE (Aug 2024, scheme mechanics, payments stopped Nov 2023, ~¥1bn debt vs 60 creditors, bankruptcy order 17 Jul 2024, chargebacks rejected, police found no fraud case)
- 東京商工リサーチ (TSR) Data Insight follow-up — FORTUNE破産1年、買い取り参加者の3分の1が自己破産 (Jul 2025, a third of ~60 buyers personally bankrupt, one with ¥13M card debt sued by card companies, suspected Ponzi / misuse of credit limits)
- n-seikei.jp — 株式会社FORTUNE(東京)/破産手続き開始決定 (Jul 2024, founded May 2021, debts ¥600M+, 60+ creditors, quasi-self-bankruptcy petition, registered representative)
- 東京経済 (Tokyo Keizai) — FORTUNE、破産手続開始決定 負債総額約10億円 (Jul 2024, expected liabilities ~¥1bn, 60 creditors, ¥1M capital, trustee 実野現, claim deadline 14 Aug 2024)
spotted an error? The club wants to know.
More like this
Jaquet Droz, Swatch Group's high-end watchmaker, ended its 18-year Japan business
Seiko invented quartz and gave the patents away — the Swiss took the luxury market
Next Eye went from ¥317M peak sales to ¥37M in debt — a watch retailer's 25-year slide
Somewhere, someone solved the problem this company failed at. 2nd Opinion →

Comments · 0
Sign in to join the comments.