案例库 · 财务与会计 · 财务决策 · 1970–1996
这条还没译成中文,下面是英文原文。
Lloyd's of London recruited Names into unlimited liability — the bill arrived
Lloyd's tripled its personally-liable investor base in the 1970s-80s. A reinsurance spiral and old asbestos claims then ruined thousands of them.
Lloyd's of London
怎么回事
Lloyd's of London was not an insurance company but a market: syndicates of wealthy individuals, called Names, put their personal fortunes behind the policies they underwrote, in exchange for a share of the premiums. Liability was unlimited — a Name could lose everything they owned, down to the family home. For nearly three centuries that structure worked because membership was small, vetted, and rich enough to absorb the occasional bad year.
From 1970 Lloyd's cut the net-worth bar for joining and went looking for capital. Membership grew from around 6,000 in the mid-1960s to over 32,000 by 1988, many of the new Names comfortably-off professionals rather than the old landed rich, drawn by double-digit historical returns and tax breaks, and largely unable to judge the risk they were underwriting. Litigants later called this recruitment drive, run while some officials reportedly knew a wave of long-tail claims was coming, 'recruit to dilute' — spread the losses over more people before they landed.
Two shocks then landed on the same members. First, the LMX spiral: excess-of-loss syndicates spent the 1980s reinsuring each other's excess-of-loss books, so a loss circulated and compounded instead of dispersing. The 1988 Piper Alpha rig explosion triggered a $1.4bn loss that some syndicates saw arrive as a 500-650% loss on capacity once it had cycled the spiral. Second, decades-old US asbestos and pollution policies, some from the 1930s-40s, produced huge punitive-damage claims Lloyd's had never reserved for.
Lloyd's posted five straight years of record losses, 1988-1992, totalling roughly £8 billion. About 1,500 of 34,000 Names were driven into bankruptcy. Litigation ran a decade; the 2000 case Society of Lloyd's v Jaffray rejected the 'recruit to dilute' fraud claim but the judge still called the ruined Names 'the innocent victims of staggering incompetence'. Lloyd's survived by admitting limited-liability corporate capital from 1993 and, in 1996, forcing through Reconstruction and Renewal — Equitas absorbed all pre-1993 liabilities at a cost of roughly $21 billion, funded by the members.
为什么会这样
- Lloyd's expanded its capital base by recruiting thousands of less wealthy Names into unlimited personal liability, without upgrading their ability to assess the risk they were underwriting
- The LMX spiral let syndicates reinsure each other's excess-of-loss books, so a single catastrophe compounded instead of dispersing, and nobody in the chain could see their true exposure
- Decades-old US asbestos and pollution liabilities went essentially unreserved, because the scale of the claims wave was treated as unquantifiable rather than underwritten for
- Governance and market discipline lagged the market's own growth: regulation stayed self-policed by the Council of Lloyd's through the years the exposure was building
教训
Growing the capital base by recruiting people who cannot judge the risk they are taking on is not diversification — it is exporting the loss to whoever understood it least.
后来呢
Lloyd's admitted limited-liability corporate capital from 1993, which soon supplied most of the market's capacity. The 1996 Reconstruction and Renewal plan created Equitas to ring-fence all pre-1993 liabilities; 95% of Names accepted settlement offers. National Indemnity (Berkshire Hathaway) took on the Equitas liabilities in 2007-2009, finally closing the tail. Lloyd's itself survived and remains a functioning market today.
资料来源
- Delusions of competence: the near-death of Lloyd's of London 1980-2002 — Economic History Society
- Lloyd's of London — Wikipedia (Names crisis, LMX spiral, Equitas)
- Lloyd's Of London Falling Down — TIME
发现哪里写错了?告诉我们。
类似的案例
这家公司栽倒的地方,别处有人漂亮地解开过。 第二意见 →

Comments · 0
登录 后就能评论。